With recent tensions between Ukraine-Russia highlighting pivotal oil and gas supply, a similar issue can brew between Bangladesh and India

The India-Bangladesh Power Trap

A reliance on India for its electricity could be contrary to Bangladesh’s geo-strategic interests.

By Zahedul Amin
The Diplomat
April 27, 2014

Following the election of its Awami League (AL) government in 2009, Bangladesh’s diplomatic relations with India have enjoyed some renewed vigor. In the years since, the relationship has flourished, with a series of high-level meetings culminating in a visit from Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2011 to sign a joint communiqué. The communiqué focused on three key aspects: peacefully resolving a long-standing border dispute, ensuring a fair allocation of Teesta river water, and allowing transit to India through Bangladesh.

Although the Bangladesh government is already offering transit facilities on a selective basis (without charging a transit fee), India has yet to deliver on its promises. The border dispute remains unresolved in the face of stiff resistance from the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), while the Teesta water sharing agreement has stalled, thanks to the belligerence of West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. A promised $1 billion credit line from India has been caught up in bureaucratic red tape. As a consolation, India has at least agreed to export 500 MW of power to Bangladesh at a competitive rate.

For its part, Bangladesh has now decided to provide a corridor for Indian power transmission, from Assam to Bihar. In return, India has promised to increase power exports to 1500 MW in the near future, which would partially assuage Bangladesh’s persistent power shortages. However, could an overt dependence on Indian electricity spell danger for Bangladesh’s strategic interests?

To answer that question, it is important to understand Bangladesh’s power sector. Power shortages remain a chronic problem for Bangladesh, mainly because of a lack of effective investment and dwindling reserves of natural gas. Currently, peak power demand for Bangladesh stands at 8,349 MW, against installed generation capacity of 10,289 MW, although only about 75 percent of that capacity is operational, leaving a substantial shortfall. In fact, the demand-supply gap was higher in 2008, which the government addressed by turning to “quick rental” power stations owned by the private sector. As of 2013, the government had arrangements with 20 of these stations, which combined generated power in excess of 1,000 MW. These stations, however, are run on diesel or heavy fuel oil, making them costlier compared to more traditional energy sources, meaning that end consumers need to be heavily subsidized by the government. Imports from India are much cheaper, at less than half the per-unit cost. Given these immediate cost advantages, the government of Bangladesh is keen to import more power from India.

However, while that might make economic sense, the question is whether Bangladesh can afford to increase its dependence on Indian power. Electricity is a key resource and the country’s manufacturing sector is entirely dependent on a seamless supply.

National elections are underway in India. A change in government looks likely, with BJP candidate Narendra Modi tipped to be the next prime minister. A new BJP government may well adopt a more hardline foreign policy stance.

A comparison can be made with the Russia-Ukraine crisis, in which Russia retains a powerful bargaining chip in the form of its shipments of natural gas. Since the falling out between the neighbors, Moscow has (through state-owned Gazprom) raised the gas price with more stringent payment terms. Russia has even threatened to cut off the natural gas supply entirely, something that would be catastrophic for the struggling Ukrainian economy.

A Bangladesh that is heavily dependent on Indian electricity could conceivably face a similar scenario in the future. In any disagreement, India could use its power card to keep Bangladesh in line. As a much smaller country, Bangladesh is already at a disadvantage in negotiating with India, a position that may be exacerbated with greater dependence on Indian power.

In the wake of these analyses, Bangladesh should think of alternative methods of generating electricity, reducing its dependence on both privately owned quick rental stations or Indian power. A long-term plan is needed to increase supply in step with rising demand. Bangladesh has adequate coal resources, which can be cheaply extracted. New power plants should be coal based, reducing pressure on natural gas reserves and expensive imported oil. Bangladesh should also construct an LNG terminal to facilitate natural gas imports.

Although India-Bangladesh relations are at an all-time high, Dhaka has mostly failed to extract anything tangible from the Indian side. India’s Border Security Force (BSF) is still regularly shooting Bangladeshi nationals, while Bangladeshi exports to India face a multitude of non-tariff barriers. With the shifting political landscape in India, the situation could be set to worsen, as the BJP has historically shown a more hardline stance towards its neighbors. In this context, Bangladesh should avoid an excessive reliance on its neighbor for electricity.

Zahedul Amin is the Co-founder and Director Finance & Strategy at LightCastle Partners, a business planning and intelligence firm specializing in emerging markets.

Current hostilities in Ukraine & the region summarized in one image

image: rense.com

Questions on Ukraine the West chooses not to answer

by: RT NEWS
March 05, 2014 19:

Ukrainian and Western refusal to answer Moscow’s hard questions explains Russia’s tough stance on the crisis in Kiev.

Ignoring Russian concerns is a Western habit adopted after the Soviet Union’s collapse; when NATO bombed Yugoslavia; during the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, and the US push to install an anti-missile shield over Europe that can target Russia.

It also happened recently when Western diplomats flocked to Ukraine to smile and wave and lobby their interests in a future Ukrainian government, while accusing Russia of meddling in Ukrainian affairs.

But it seems that in Ukraine lies Russia’s red line and Moscow no longer takes “don’t know, don’t care” for an answer.

Here’s the questions.

1. Why did the opposition oust Yanukovich after he conceded to their demands?
On February 21, Yanukovich and the three Ukrainian parliamentary faction leaders signed a reconciliation deal co-signed by Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland. A gesture that their countries would serve as agreement guarantors.

The agreement provides a de-escalation roadmap of constitutional reform, a national unity government, early presidential election and disbandment of Maidan fighter groups.

Hours after it was signed, Right Sector radicals, key to the violence unleashed in Kiev which left a hundred people dead, gave Yanukovich an ultimatum: resign or face a siege of his residence.

Against Moscow’s advice, Yanukovich fled.

Vladimir Putin’s comments illuminate the Russian position here: "He [Yanukovich] had in fact given up his power already, and as I believe, as I told him, he had no chance of being re-elected.. What was the purpose of all those illegal, unconstitutional actions, why did they have to create this chaos in the country? Armed and masked militants are still roaming the streets of Kiev. This is a question to which there is no answer."

Russian president Vladimir Putin (AFP photo)

Russia says the February 21 agreement must be implemented. The opposition signed it yet allows an uncontrolled militia of violent armed radicals send fear and loathing across a large swath of Ukraine.

The US says the agreement no longer matters – because Yanukovich fled. The EU signatories don’t seem to be bothered about it either.

2. Why is the coup-appointed govt replacing oligarchs linked to Yanukovich with... oligarchs?
Popular resentment of Yanukovich blossomed over corruption. Protesters pointed to power abuse, theft and allowing linked-oligarchs raid businesses of other clans. Evidence came readily after they fled - photos of their homes’ sumptuous interiors.

But the new self-appointed govt is replacing Yanukovich’s oligarchs with their own. Kiev just appointed billionaires as governors of Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk respectively, a move that also drew Putin’s ire: "Mr. Kolomoisky was appointed governor of Dnepropetrovsk. This is a unique crook. He even managed to cheat our oligarch Roman Abramovich two or three years ago. Scammed him.."

Both hold major assets in their respective regions and thousands depend on them for work. Both appointments are meant to stabilize a volatile society and ensure loyalty to the capital but critics say Kiev is reinventing fiefdoms to nobility in exchange for servitude. For Putin, who famously excluded oligarchs from politics, the move is an anathema.

3. Why did the post-coup parliament strip Russian language of its regional status?
A bill repealing a law on regional languages was among dozens rubber-stamped by a chaotic Ukrainian parliament in the first post-coup days. It allowed the Ukrainian nationalist and anti-Russian Svoboda (Freedom) Party put a feather in its cap. Yet it sent a ripple of hostility south and east from Kiev, where Russian-speakers are a large minority or even majority. Kiev pledged to restore the status of Russian but now says the acting Ukrainian president won’t sign such a bill into law.

4. Why did Kiev attack the Constitutional Court?
Several Constitutional Court judges were accused of violating their oath and abruptly fired amid coup govt orders they be prosecuted. The judges branded this as an attack on the principle of separation of powers. Putin called it "monkey business".

As Yanukovich was not procedurally impeached but through a simple show of hands the legality of his impeachment is open to challenges taken by several Ukrainian regions and, diplomatically, by Russia. The Ukrainian Constitutional Court is the proper authority to rule on the issue yet the new Kiev admin is mooting totally disbanding it and giving its functions to the Supreme Court.

5. Why would the West support the coup in Ukraine?
From the Russian perspective, the West fueled the fires of protest and ensured the Ukrainian government was toppled. Now it is attempting to legitimize its factious replacement. What Russia calls an unconstitutional coup, the West is branding a public revolution. It is possible that it is both.

Moscow does not challenge the reality. It doesn’t seek a Yanukovich return to power. It would work with the people who ousted him, as it did with the Yushchenko presidency. But Moscow demands the Kiev coup govt carries a national mandate to govern, in both east and west . Without it, any government is unsustainable.

Putin’s position is that it now maybe too late, despite his repeated warnings Ukraine would polarize. "Did our partners in the West and those who call themselves the government in Kiev now not foresee that events would take this turn? I said to them over and over: Why are you whipping the country into a frenzy like this?"

A stable Ukraine is essential for Russia for many reasons, humanitarian being just few of them. Of course Russia wants ethnic Russians in Ukraine to be safe from potential violence and persecution. But there are also more pragmatic considerations as well.

There’s the Black Sea Fleet, strong economic interdependence and there is gas. Ukraine transits Russian natural gas to Europe and is thus essential to the Russian and European economies. Yet now a desperate Kiev mulls privatizing its gas pipelines to fill its empty coffers, while Moscow’s questions remain unheard.

What mainstream media isn`t telling about Ukraine, Russia and Crimea - learn the facts

Russia’s 25,000-troop allowance & other facts you may not know about Crimea
RT NEWS
March 04, 2014

People watch Russian Navy ship enter Crimean port city of Sevastopol March 2, 2014 (Reuters/Baz Ratner)

Ukraine’s statement at the UN that ‘16,000 Russian soldiers had been deployed’ across Crimea sparked a MSM feeding frenzy that steadfastly ignored any hard facts that got in their way.

Especially unwelcome is the fact that the so-called ‘invasion force’ has been there for 15 years already.

The media many trust described in hysterical tones how the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was under a full-scale Russian invasion with headlines like: “Ukraine says Russia sent 16,000 troops to Crimea”, “Ukraine crisis deepens as Russia sends more troops into Crimea,” as well as “What can Obama do about Russia's invasion of Crimea?”.

Facts, and ardent statements by top Russian diplomats were totally ignored by the western ‘war press’.

Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin pointed to the longstanding 25,000 troop allowance while FM Sergey Lavrov stressed the Russian military “strictly executes the agreements which stipulate the Russian fleet’s presence in Ukraine, and follows the stance and claims coming from the legitimate authority in Ukraine and in this case the legitimate authority of the Autonomous Republic Crimea as well.”

So here they are, the facts:
1) A Russian naval presence in Crimea dates to 1783 when the port city of Sevastopol was founded by Russian Prince Grigory Potemkin. Crimea was part of Russia until Nikita Khruschev gave it to Ukraine in 1954.

2) In 1997, amid the wreckage of the USSR, Russia & Ukraine signed a Partition Treaty determining the fate of the military bases and vessels in Crimea. The deal sparked widespread officer ‘defections’ to Russia and was ratified by the Russian & Ukrainian parliaments in 1999. Russia received 81.7 percent of the fleet’s ships after paying the Ukrainian government US$526.5 million.

3) The deal allowed the Russian Black Sea Fleet to stay in Crimea until 2017. This was extended by another 25 years to 2042 with a 5-year extension option in 2010.

4) Moscow annually writes off $97.75 million of Kiev’s debt for the right to use Ukrainian waters and radio frequencies, and to compensate for the Black Sea Fleet’s environmental impact.

5) The Russian navy is allowed up to

- 25,000 troops,

- 24 artillery systems with a caliber smaller than 100 mm,

- 132 armored vehicles, and

- 22 military planes, on Crimean territory.

6) Five Russian naval units are stationed in the port city of Sevastopol, in compliance with the treaty:

- The 30th Surface Ship Division formed by the 11th Antisubmarine Ship Brigade. Comprises the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship guard missile cruiser Moskva as well as Kerch, Ochakov, Smetlivy, Ladny, and Pytlivy vessels, and the 197th Landing Ship Brigade, consisting of seven large amphibious vessels;

- The 41st Missile Boat Brigade includes the 166th Fast Attack Craft Division, consisting of Bora and Samum hovercrafts as well as small missile ships Mirazh and Shtil, and 295th missile Boat Division;

- The 247th Separate Submarine Division, consisting of two diesel submarines – B-871 Alrosa and B-380 Svyatoy Knyaz Georgy;

- The 68th Harbor Defense Ship Brigade formed by 4 vessels of the 400th Antisubmarine Ship Battalion and 418 Mine Hunting Ship Division respectively.;

- The 422nd Separate Hydrographic Ship Division boasts the Cheleken, Stvor, Donuzlav and GS-402 survey vessels and hydrographic boats.

7) Russia has two airbases in Crimea, in Kacha and Gvardeysky.

8) Russian coastal forces in Ukraine consist of the 1096th Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in Sevastopol and the 810th Marine Brigade, which hosts around 2,000 marines.

9) Russian naval units are permitted to implement security measures at their permanent post as well as during re-deployments in cooperation with Ukrainian forces, in accordance with Russia’s armed forces procedures.

Authorities in the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea – where over half the population is Russian – requested Moscow’s assistance after the self-proclaimed government in Kiev introduced a law abolishing the use of languages other than Ukrainian in official circumstances.

Last week, Russia’s Federation Council unanimously approved President Vladimir Putin’s request to send the country’s military forces to Ukraine to ensure peace and order in the region “until the socio-political situation in the country is stabilized.”

However, the final say about deploying troops lies with Putin, who hasn’t yet made such a decision, stressing that deploying military force would be a last resort.

Mutant animal discovered in Ukraine. Is it the fabled 'Chupacabra' or an experiment gone wrong?

Fabled 'Chupacabra' or mutant fox poisoned by radiation? Hunters baffled by dog-like animal found in former Soviet republic
Mythical beast - named 'goat sucker' in Spanish because of its carnivorous diet - is thought to have been discovered in remotest Ukraine

By WILL STEWART
DAILYMAIL
August 23, 2012

Vets in Ukraine are struggling to identify a 'mutant' animal shot by hunters in a remote area of the former Soviet republic.

Locals say it is a mystery 'Chupacabra' - allegedly sighted a few times in recent years - that preys on rabbits, goats and house animals.

Grey in colour and with ‘fangs’ and a longish neck, it has shorter front legs, slightly resembling a kangaroo, while also showing a likeness to a dog and a fox, say those who have seen it.

Mystery: The discovery of the strange animal in Ukraine has baffled experts

There were claims that it could be a 'mutant' fox poisoned by radiation, while another theory was that it maybe a hybrid originating from a Soviet plant conducting tests on animals relating to chemical or biological weapons development.

‘A creature we were not supposed to see has escaped from a secret defence lab,’ said one comment.

‘The animal doesn't look like a fox or a wolf, or a raccoon,’ Mikhail Ilchenko, deputy head of the district veterinary service in Mikhailovskoe, told Komsomolskaya Pravda, Ukraine.

‘It cannot even be a marten. I have never seen such animal before. But, judging by the fangs, I can definitely say that it is a predator.’

Alien: The strange creature resembles a fox but bears features similar to a kangaroo

Speculation: The animal could be the mythical 'Chupacabra' - which is Spanish for goat sucker - is a legendary cryptid rumoured to inhabit parts of North and South America

Local vets took the skinny, short-haired creature to the Zoological Museum of Zaporozhye National University.

‘There is something common with a fox, and a dog,’ said director Alexander Korotya...

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